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Understanding Enron: AIt=s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid@
by John C. Coffee, Jr..
What do we know after Enron=s implosion that we did not know before it? The
conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary
system of corporate governance.1 Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under
what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions (and
Enron is surely that) tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron=s case, the firm=s
strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence
confirming what he or she already believed.2
Nonetheless, the problem with viewing Enron as an indication of any systematic
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As a result, proposals to reform corporate governance through legislation, codes
of best practice, and heightened listing standards are proliferating. See, e.g., Tom
Hamburger, ACorporate-Governance Bill Weighed,@ The Wall Street Journal, May
3, 2002 at p. C-10 (discussing proposed AShareholder Bill of Rights@); Kate Kelly,
AStock Exchanges Fortify Watchdog Roles,@ The Wall Street Journal, April 30,
2002 at p. C-1. The SEC has proposed changes in financial reporting, which
proposals have encountered mixed reviews. See Gretchen Morgenson,
AInformation Sooner, Yes, But Make It Better Too,@ New York Times, May 5,
2002, Section 3-1. Other recurring legislature proposals address auditors and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board. See Michael Schroeder, ATauzin Bill
Aims to Bolster FASB With Firms= Fees,@ The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2002
at p. A-4.
This observation applies with special force to academics. Those who doubted
stock market efficiency before Enron doubt it even more afterwards, pointing to
the slow fall of Enron stock over the last half of 2001. Those who are skeptical of
outside directors are even more convinced that their wisdom has been confirmed.
For example, my Columbia colleague, Jeffrey Gordon, has proposed a new model
of “trustee/directors” to populate the audit committee and perform certain other
guardian roles. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management
and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reactions, 69 U.
Chi. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming in 2002).
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governance failure is that its core facts are maddeningly unique. Most obviously, Enron=s
governance structure was sui generis. Other public corporations simply have not authorized their
chief financial officer to run an independent entity that enters into billions of dollars of risky and
volatile trading transactions with them; nor have they allowed their senior officers to profit from
such self-dealing transactions without broad supervision or even comprehension of the profits
involved.3 Nor have other corporations incorporated thousands of subsidiaries and employed
them in a complex web of off-balance sheet partnerships.4
In short, Enron was organizationally unique - - a virtual hedge fund in the view of some,5
yet a firm that morphed almost overnight into its bizarre structure from origins as a stodgy gas
pipeline company. The pace of this transition seemingly outdistanced the development of risk
management systems and an institutional culture paralleling those of traditional financial firms.
Precisely for this reason, the passive performance of Enron=s board of directors cannot fairly be
extrapolated and applied as an assessment of all boards generally.6 Boards of directors may or
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Although no substantive findings have yet been made by any court or agency,
these are the essentially findings of a special committee of Enron=s own board.
See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (the
APowers Report@), February 1, 2002.
Although complete information is still lacking, Enron appears to have established
nearly 3,000 subsidiaries and partnerships in Delaware, the Cayman Islands, the
Netherlands and elsewhere. See Glenn Kessler, AEnron Agrees to Let Congress
See Tax Returns,@ Washington Post, February 16, 2002 at p. A13.
Indeed, some commentators view Enron as virtually a hedge fund. See Frank
Partnoy, AEnron and Derivatives@ (available on Social Sciences Research Network
at www.ssrn.com at id=302332) (testimony of Professor Frank Partnoy before
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).
No doubt, there are other corporations in which an entrepreneurial founder has
dominated the board and caused it to approve dubious self-dealing transactions.
WorldCom Inc. and Global Crossing quickly come to mind, and the resignation of
the former=s chief executive and the bankruptcy of the latter suggests that firms
3

may not perform their duties adequately, but, standing alone, Enron proves little. In this sense,
Enron is an anecdote, an isolated data point that cannot yet fairly be deemed to amount to a
trend.
Viewed from another perspective, however, Enron does furnish ample evidence of a
systematic governance failure. Although other spectacular securities frauds have been
discovered from time to time over recent decades,7 they have not generally disturbed the overall
market. In contrast, Enron has clearly roiled the market and created a new investor demand for
transparency. Behind this disruption lies the market=s discovery that it cannot rely upon the
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with weak corporate governance do not perform well during market downturns.
See Rebecca Blumenstein and Jared Sandburg, AWorldCom CEO Quits Amid
Probe of Firm=s Finances,@ The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2002 at p. A-1. The
starting point of this article is not the premise that contemporary corporate
governance is fundamentally sound, but rather that there is high variance among
boards - - some very good, and others quite bad. Its conclusion is, however, that
reliable corporate governance is not possible without reliable gatekeepers - because boards necessarily depend on professional assistance from gatekeepers.
Many of these frauds have involved far more sinister and predatory conduct than
has yet come to light in Enron. For example, officers of Equity Funding of
America counterfeited bogus insurance policies in order to convince their auditors
that their product was selling. See Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 646, 648-50
(1983) (discussing the basic fraud in the course of analyzing the liability of a
tippee who advised clients to sell this stock). More recently, officers of Bre-X
Minerals Ltd. apparently salted mining samples taken from the firms properties in
Indonesia to convince the market that it had discovered one of the largest gold
mines in history. During the period that these false statements were issued, BreX’s stock price rose from $2.85 per share to $224.95; on discovery of the fraud,
the stock collapsed and the company went into bankruptcy. See, McNamara v.
Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4571 (E.D. Tex. March 30, 2001).
Similar observations could be made about other recent scandals, including OPM
in the early 1970's, Lincoln Savings & Loan in the 1980's, or the massive BCCI
bank failure in the 1990's. Each dwarfs Enron in terms of the culpability of senior
management. Nor are the market losses greater in Enron. The stock declines in
2001 in Lucent Technologies and Cisco Systems were considerably greater in
terms of decline in total market capitalization, even though neither of these cases
has elicited any public enforcement proceeding.
4

professional gatekeepers - - auditors, analysts, and others - - whom the market has long trusted to
filter, verify and assess complicated financial information. Properly understood, Enron is a
demonstration of gatekeeper failure, and the question it most sharply poses is how this failure
should be rectified.
Although the term Agatekeeper@ is commonly used,8 here it requires special definition.
Inherently, gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification
services to investors.9 These services can consist of verifying a company=s financial statements
(as the independent auditor does), evaluating the creditworthiness of the company (as the debt
rating agency does), assessing the company=s business and financial prospects vis-a-viz its rivals
(as the securities analyst does), or appraising the fairness of a specific transaction (as the
investment banker does in delivering a fairness opinion). Attorneys can also be gatekeepers
when they lend their professional reputations to a transaction, but, as later discussed, the more
typical role of attorneys serving public corporations is that of the transaction engineer, rather
than the reputational intermediary.
Characteristically, the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or vouches for the
corporate client=s own statements about itself or a specific transaction. This duplication is
necessary because the market recognizes that the gatekeeper has a lesser incentive to lie than
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The term “gatekeeper” is not simply an academic concept. In Securities Act
Release No. 7870 (June 30, 2000), the SEC recently noted that “the federal laws ..
make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public securities markets.” 2000
SEC LEXIS 1389 *
For a fuller, more theoretical consideration of the concept of the gatekeeper, see
R. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
Yale L.J. 857 (1984); R. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2. J.L., Econ. & Org. 53 (1986); S. Choi, Market Lessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U.L. Rev. 116 (1998).
5

does its client and thus regards the gatekeeper=s assurance or evaluation as more credible. To be
sure, the gatekeeper as watchdog is typically paid by the party that it is to watch, but its relative
credibility stems from the fact that it is in effect pledging a reputational capital that it has built
up over many years of performing similar services for numerous clients. In theory, such
reputational capital would not be sacrificed for a single client and a modest fee. Here, as
elsewhere, however, logic and experience can conflict. Despite the clear logic of the gatekeeper
rationale, experience over the 1990's suggests that professional gatekeepers do acquiesce in
managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses seem to dwarf the gains to be
made from the individual client.10
Why has there been an apparent failure in the market for gatekeeping services? This
brief comment offers some explanations, but also acknowledges that rival explanations lead to
very different prescriptions. Thus, the starting point for responding to the Enron debacle begins
with asking the right question. That question is not: why did some managements engage in
fraud? But rather it is: why did the gatekeepers let them?
I. The Changing Status of the Gatekeeper
In theory, a gatekeeper has many clients, each of whom pay it a fee that is modest in
proportion to the firm=s overall revenues. Arthur Andersen had, for example, 2,300 audit
clients.11 On this basis, the firm seemingly had little incentive to risk its considerable
reputational capital for any one client. During the 1990's, many courts bought this logic hook,
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This observation is hardly original with this author. See, for example, Robert A.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1333 (2000).
See Michelle Mittelstadt, AAndersen Charged With Obstruction, Vows to Fight,@
Dallas Morning News, March 15, 2002 at p.1.
6

line and sinker. For example, in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,12 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, outlined precisely the foregoing theory:
“The complaint does not allege that [the auditor] had anything to
gain from any fraud by [its client]. An accountant=s greatest asset
is its reputation for honesty, closely followed by its reputation for
careful work. Fees for two years= audits could not approach the
losses [that the auditor] would suffer from a perception that it
would muffle a client=s fraud ... [The auditor=s] partners shared
none of the gain from any fraud and were exposed to a large
fraction of the loss. It would have been irrational for any of them
to have joined cause with [the client].”13
Of course, the modest fees in some of these cases (the audit fee was only $90,000 in Robin v.
Arthur Young & Co.)14 were well less than the $100 million in prospective annual fees from
Enron that Arthur Andersen & Co. explicitly foresaw. But does this difference really explain
Arthur Andersen=s downward spiral? After all, Arthur Andersen earned over $9 billion in
revenues in 2001.15
Once among the most respected of all professionals service firms (including law,
accounting, and consulting firms), Andersen became involved in a series of now well-known
securities frauds - - e.g., Waste Management, Sunbeam, HBOCMcKesson, The Baptist
Foundation, and now Global Crossing - - that culminated in its disastrous association with
Enron. Little, however, suggests that Arthur Andersen was more reckless or less responsible
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901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1994); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990)
(mere $90,000 annual audit fee would have been an Airrational@ motive for
fraud).
Id. at 629.
See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co,, 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir 1990).
Arthur Andersen=s website reports that revenues for 2001 were $9.34 billion. See
www.andersen.com.
7

than its peers.16

Instead, the evidence suggests that something lead to a general erosion in the

quality of financial reporting during the late 1990s. During this period, earnings restatements,
long a proxy for fraud, suddenly soared. To cite only the simplest quantitative measure, the
number of earnings restatements by publicly held corporations averaged 49 per year from 1990
to 1997, then increased to 91 in 1998, and finally skyrocketed to 150 and 156, respectively, in
1999 and 2000.17
What caused this sudden spike in earning restatements? Because public corporations
must fear stock price drops, securities class actions, and SEC investigations in the wake of
earnings restatements, it is not plausible to read this sudden increase as the product of a new
tolerance for, or indifference to, restatements. Even if some portion of the change might be
attributed to a new SEC activism about Aearnings management,”18 which became an SEC priority
16

17
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Compared to its peers within the Big Five accounting firms, Arthur Andersen
appears to have been responsible for a less than its proportionate share of
earnings restatements. While it audited 21% of Big 5 audit clients, it was
responsible for only 15% of the restatements experienced by the Big Five firms
between 1997 and 2001. On this basis, it was arguably slightly more conservative
than its peers. See APeriscope: How Arthur Andersen Begs for Business,@
Newsweek, March 18, 2002 at p. 6. In discussions with industry insiders, the
only respect in which I have ever heard Andersen characterized as different from
its peers in the Big Five was that it marketed itself as a firm in which the audit
partner could make the final call on difficult accounting questions without having
to secure approval from senior officials within the firm. Although this could
translate into a weaker system of internal controls, this hypothesis seems
inconsistent with Arthur Andersen=s apparently below average rate of earnings
restatements.
See Moriarty and Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial
Reporting, 17 Financial Executive 53, at 54 (July/August 2001).
Accounting firms have sometimes attempted to explain this increase on the basis
that the SEC tightened the definition of Amateriality@ in the late 1990's. This
explanation is not very convincing, in part because the principal SEC statement
that tightened the definition of materiality - - Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 - was issued in mid-1999, after the number of restatements had already begun to
soar in 1998. Also, SAB No. 99 did not truly mandate restatements, but only
8

in 1998,19 corporate issuers will not voluntarily expose themselves to enormous liability just to
please the SEC. Moreover, not only did the number of earnings restatements increase over this
period, but so also did the amounts involved.20 Earnings restatements thus seem an indication
that earlier earnings management has gotten out of hand. Accordingly, the spike in earnings
restatements in the late 1990's implies that the Big 5 firms had earlier acquiesced in aggressive
earnings management - - and, in particular, premature revenue recognition - - that no longer
could be sustained.
This apparent pattern of increased deference by the gatekeeper to its client during the
1990's was not limited to the auditing profession. Securities analysts have probably encountered
even greater recent public and Congressional skepticism about their objectivity. Again, much of
the evidence is anecdotal, but striking. As late as October 2001, 16 out of the 17 securities
analysts covering Enron maintained Abuy@ or Astrong buy@ recommendations on its stock right up
until virtually the moment of its bankruptcy filing.21 The first brokerage firm to downgrade
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suggested that a rule of thumb that assumed that amounts under 5% were
inherently immaterial could not be applied reflexively. See Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, 64 F.R. 45150 (August 19, 1999).
The SEC=s prioritization of earnings management as a principal enforcement
target can be approximately dated to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt=s now famous
speech on the subject in 1998. See Arthur Levitt, AThe Numbers Game, Remarks
at NYU Center for Law and Business@ (September 28, 1998).
According to Moriarty and Livingston, supra note 17, companies that restated
earnings suffered market losses of $17.7 billion in 1998, $24.2 billion in 1999,
and $31.2 billion in 2000. Id. at 55. Expressed as a percentage of the overall
capitalization of the market (which was ascendingly hyperbolically over this
period), these losses for 1998 through 2000 came to 0.13%, 0.14% and 0.19%,
respectively, of market capitalization. In short, however expressed, the losses
increased over this period.
See “Statement of Frank Torres, Legislative Counsel, Consumers Union, Before
the United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, on the Collapse of
Enron: The Role Analysts Played and the Conflicts They Face,” February 27,
9

Enron to a Asell@ rating in 2001 was Prudential Securities, which no longer engages in investment
banking activities.22 Revealingly, Prudential is also believed to have the highest proportion of
sell ratings among the stocks it evaluates.23
Much like auditors, analysts are also Areputational intermediaries,@ whose desire to be
perceived as credible and objective may often be subordinated to their desire to retain and please
investment banking clients. One statistic inevitably comes up in any assessment of analyst
objectivity: namely, the curious fact that the ratio of Abuy@ recommendations to Asell@
recommendations has recently been as high as 100 to 1.24 In truth, this particular statistic may
not be as compelling as it initially sounds because there are obvious reasons why Abuy@
recommendations will normally outnumber Asell@ recommendations, even in the absence of
conflicts of interest.25 Yet, a related statistic may be more revealing because it underscores the
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2002, at p.6 (AIn the case of Enron, 16 out of 17 analysts had a buy or a strong
buy rating, one had a hold, none had a sell - - even as the company stock had lost
over half its value and its CEO suddenly resigned.@). 2002 WL 2011028; see
also testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School of Law, Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, January 24, 2002 (similar 16 out of 17 tabulation).
See Lauren Young, AIndependence Day,@ SMARTMONEY, May 1, 2001, p. 28.
Vol. XI, No. V, 2002 WL 2191410.
Id.
A study by Thomas Financial/First Call has found that less than one percent of the
28,000 stock recommendations issued by brokerage firm analysts during late 1999
and most of 2000 were Asell@ recommendations. See Opening Statement of
Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski; Ranking Democratic Member, House
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, AHearing on Analyzing the Analysts,@ June 14, 2001 at p. 1 (citing
and discussing study).
ASell-side@ analysts are employed by brokerage firms that understandably wish to
maximize brokerage transactions. In this light, a Abuy@ recommendation
addresses the entire market and certainly all the firm=s customers, while a Asell@
recommendation addresses only those customers who own the stock (probably
well less than 1%) and those with margin accounts who are willing to sell the
10

apparent transition that took place in the 1990's. According to a study by Thomson Financial,
the ratio of Abuy@ to Asell@ recommendations increased from 6 to 1 in 1991 to 100 to 1 by 2000.26
Again, it appears that something happened in the 1990's that compromised the independence and
objectivity of the gatekeepers on whom our private system of corporate governance depends.27
Not surprisingly, it also appears that this loss of relative objectivity can harm investors.28
II. Explaining Gatekeeper Failure
None of the watchdogs that should have detected Enron=s collapse - - auditors, analysts or
debt rating agencies - - did so before the penultimate moment. This is the true common
denominator in the Enron debacle: the collective failure of the gatekeepers. Why did the
watchdogs not bark in the night when it now appears in hindsight that a massive fraud took
place? Here, two quite different, although complementary, stories can be told. The first will be
called the Ageneral deterrence@ story; and the second, the Abubble@ story. The first is essentially
economic in its premises; and the second, psychological.
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stock Ashort.@ In addition, Asell@ recommendations annoy not only the issuer
company, but also institutional investors who are afraid that sell
recommendations will Aspook@ retail investors, causing them to panic and sell,
while the institution is Alocked into@ a large position that cannot easily be
liquidated.
See Opening Statement of Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski, supra note 24, at 1.
(citing study by First Call).
Participants in the industry also report that its professional culture changed
dramatically in the late 1990's, particularly as investment banking firms began to
hire Astar@ analysts for their marketing clout. See Gretchen Morgenson, ARequiem
for an Honorable Profession@ New York Times, May 5, 2002 at Section 3-1
(suggesting major change dates from around 1996).
Although the empirical evidence is limited, it suggests that Aindependent@ analysts
(i.e., analysts not associated with the underwriter for a particular issuer) behave
differently than, and tend to outperform, analysts who are associated with the
issuer=s underwriter. See R. Michaely and K. Womack, Conflict of Interest and
the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 Review of Financial
Studies 653 (1999).
11

a. The Deterrence Explanation: The Underdeterred Gatekeeper
The general deterrence story focuses on the decline in the expected liability costs arising
out of acquiescence by auditors in aggressive accounting policies favored by managements. It
postulates that, during the 1990's, the risk of auditor liability declined, while the benefits of
acquiescence increased. Economics 101 teaches us that when the costs go down, while the
benefits associated with any activity go up, the output of the activity will increase. Here, the
activity that increased was auditor acquiescence.
Why did the legal risks go down during the 1990's? The obvious list of reasons would
include:
(1) the Supreme Court=s Lampf, Pleva decision in 1991, which significantly shortened the
statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud;29
(2) the Supreme Court=s Central Bank of Denver decision, 30 which in 1994 eliminated
private Aaiding and abetting@ liability in securities fraud cases;
(3) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (APSLRA@), which (a) raised the
pleading standards for securities class actions to a level well above that applicable to fraud
actions generally; (b) substituted proportionate liability for Ajoint and several@ liability; (c)
restricted the sweep of the RICO statute so that it could no longer convert securities fraud class
29

30

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertston, 501 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1991)
(creating a federal rule requiring plaintiffs to file within one year of when they
should have known of the violation underlying their action, but in no event more
than three years after the violation). This one to three year period was typically
shorter than the previously applicable limitations periods which were determined
by analogy to state statutes and often permitted a five or six year delay - - if that
was the period within which a common law fraud action could be maintained in
the particular state).
Central Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
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actions for compensatory damages into actions for treble damages; and (d) adopted a very
protective safe harbor for forward-looking information; and
(4) the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (ASLUSA@) which abolished
state court class actions alleging securities fraud.31
Not only did the threat of private enforcement decline, but the prospect of public
enforcement similarly subsided. In particular, there is reason to believe that, from some point in
the 1980's until the late 1990's, the SEC shifted its enforcement focus away from actions against
the Big Five accounting firms towards other priorities.32 In any event, the point here is not that
any of these changes were necessarily unjustified or excessive,33 but rather that their collective
impact was to appreciably reduce the risk of liability. Auditors were the special beneficiaries of
many of these provisions. For example, the pleading rules and the new standard of proportionate
31

32
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See Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). For an analysis and critique of this statute, see Richard Painter,
Responding to A False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1998).
This point has been orally made to me by several former SEC officials, including
Stanley Sporkin, the long-time former head of the Commission’s Division of
Enforcement. They believe that the SEC’s enforcement action against Arthur
Andersen, which was resolved in June, 2001, was one of the very few (and
perhaps the only) enforcement action brought against a Big Five accounting firm
on fraud grounds during the 1990's. See Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, SEC Litigation Release No. 17039, 2001 SEC LEXIS
1159 (June 19, 2001). Although the Commission did bring charges during the
1990's against individual partners in these firms, the Commission appears to have
been deterred from bringing suits against the Big Five themselves because such
actions were extremely costly in manpower and expense and the defendants could
be expected to resist zealously. In contrast, during the 1980's, especially during
Mr. Sporkin’s tenure as head of the Enforcement Division, the SEC regularly
brought enforcement actions against the Big Five.
Indeed, this author would continue to support proportionate liability for auditors
on fairness grounds and sees no problem with the PSLRA=s heightened pleading
standards, as they have been interpreted by some courts. See, e.g., Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
13

liability protected them far more than it did most corporate defendants.34 Although auditors are
still sued today, the settlement value of cases against auditors has gone way down.
Correspondingly, the benefits of acquiescence to auditors rose over this same period, as
the Big Five learned during the 1990's how to cross-sell consulting services and to treat the
auditing function principally as a portal of entry into a lucrative client. Prior to the mid-1990's,
the provision of consulting services to audit clients was infrequent and insubstantial in the
aggregate.35 Yet, according to one recent survey, the typical large public corporation now pays
its auditor for consulting services three times what it pays the same auditor for auditing
services.36 Not only did auditing firms see more profit potential in consulting than in auditing,
34

35

36

At a minimum, plaintiffs today must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a
Astrong inference of fraud.@ See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, supra note 33. At the
outset of a case, it may be possible to plead such facts with respect to the
management of the corporate defendant (for example, based on insider sales by
such persons prior to the public disclosure of the adverse information that caused
the stock drop), but it is rarely possible to plead such information with respect to
the auditors (who by law cannot own stock in their client). In short, the plaintiff
faces a ACatch 22" dilemma in suing the auditor: it cannot plead fraud with
particularity until its obtains discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under the
PSLRA until it pleads fraud with particularity.
Consulting fees paid by audit clients exploded during the 1990's. According to
the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, who was appointed in 1999 by the Public
Oversight Board at the request of the SEC to study audit practices, Aaudit firms=
fees from consulting services for their SEC clients increased from 17% ... of audit
fees in 1990 to 67% . . . in 1999.@ See the Panel on Audit Effectiveness,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Exposure Draft 2000) at p. 102. In
1990, the Panel found that 80% of the Big Five firms= SEC clients received no
consulting services from their auditors, and only 1% of those SEC clients paid
consulting fees exceeding their auditing fees to the Big Five. Id. at 102. While
the Panel found only marginal changes during the 1990's, later studies have found
that consulting fees have become a multiple of the audit fee for large public
corporations. See text and note infra at note 36.
A survey by the Chicago Tribune this year finds that the one hundred largest
corporations in the Chicago area (determined on the basis of market
capitalization) paid on average consulting fees to their auditors that were over
three times the audit fee paid the same auditor. See Janet Kidd Stewart and
14

but they began during the 1990's to compete based on a strategy of Alow balling@ under which
auditing services were offered at rates that were marginal to arguably below cost. The rationale
for such a strategy was that the auditing function was essentially a loss leader by which more
lucrative services could be marketed.
Appealing as this argument may seem that the provision of consulting services eroded
auditor independence, it is subject to at least one important rebuttal. Those who defend the
propriety of consulting services by auditors respond that the growth of consulting services made
little real difference, because the audit firm is already conflicted by the fact that the client pays
its fees.37 More importantly, the audit partner of a major client (such as Enron) is particularly
conflicted by the fact that such partner has virtually a Aone-client@ practice. Should the partner
lose that client for any reason, the partner will likely need to find employment elsewhere. In
short, both critics and defenders of the status quo tend to agree that the audit partner is already
inevitably compromised by the desire to hold the client. From this premise, a prophylactic rule
prohibiting the firm=s involvement in consulting would seemingly achieve little.
While true in part, this analysis misses a key point: namely, how difficult it is for the
client to fire the auditor in the real world. Because of this difficulty, the unintended consequence
of combining consulting services with auditing services in one firm is that the union of the two
enables the client to more effectively threaten the auditing firm in a Alow visibility@ way. To

37

Andrew Countryman, ALocal Audit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting Deals, Hiring
Practices In Question,@ Chicago Tribune, February 24, 2002 at p. C-1. The
extreme example in this study was Motorola, which had over a 16:1 ratio between
consulting fees and audit fees.
For the academic view that Aauditor independence@ is an impossible quest, in
large part because the client pays the auditor=s fees, see Sean O=Conner The
Inevitability of Enron And the Impossibility of >Auditor Independence Under the
Current Audit System, (forthcoming in 2002).
15

illustrate this point, let us suppose, for example, that a client becomes dissatisfied with an auditor
who refuses to endorse the aggressive accounting policy favored by its management. Today, the
client cannot easily fire the auditor. Firing the auditor is a costly step, inviting potential public
embarrassment, public disclosure of the reasons for the auditor=s dismissal or resignation, and
potential SEC intervention.38 However, if the auditor also becomes a consultant to the client, the
client can then easily terminate the auditor as a consultant (or reduce its use of the firm=s
consulting services) in retaliation for the auditor=s intransigence. This low visibility response
requires no disclosure, invites no SEC oversight, and yet disciplines the audit firm so that it
would possibly be motivated to replace the intransigent audit partner. In effect, the client can
both bribe (or coerce) the auditor in its core professional role by raising (or reducing) its use of
consulting of services.
Of course, this argument that the client can discipline and threaten the auditor/consultant
in ways that it could not discipline the simple auditor is based more on logic than actual case
histories. But it does fit the available data. A recent study by academic accounting experts,
based on proxy statements filed during the first half of 2001, finds that those firms that
purchased more non-audit services from their auditor (as a percentage of the total fee paid to the
audit firm) were more likely to fit the profile of a firm engaging in earnings management.39
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Item 4 (AChanges in Registrants Certifying Accountant@) of Form 8-K requires a
Areporting@ company to file a Form 8-K within five days after the resignation or
dismissal of the issuer=s independent accountant or that of the independent
accountant for a significant subsidiary of the issuer. The Form 8-K must then
provide the elaborate disclosures mandated by Item 304 of Regulation S-K
relating to any dispute or disagreement between the auditor and the accountant.
See 17 CFR 228.304 (AChanges in and Disagreements With Accountants on
Accounting and Financial Disclosure@).
See Richard Frankel, Marilyn Johnson, and Karen Nelson, The Relation Between
Auditors= Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, MIT Sloan Working
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b. The Irrational Market Story
Alternatively, Enron=s and Arthur Andersen=s downfalls can be seen as consequences of a
classic bubble that overtook the equity markets in the late 1990's and produced a market
euphoria in which gatekeepers became temporarily irrelevant. Indeed, in an atmosphere of
euphoria in which stock prices ascend endlessly and exponentially, gatekeepers are largely a
nuisance to management, which does not need them to attract investors. Gatekeepers are
necessary only when investors are cautious and skeptical, and in a market bubble, caution and
skepticism are largely abandoned. Arguably, auditors were used in such an environment only
because SEC rules mandated their use or because no individual firm wished to call attention to
itself by becoming the first to dispense with them. In any event, if we assume that the auditor
will be largely ignored by euphoric investors, the rational auditor=s best competitive strategy (at
least for the short term) was to become as acquiescent and low cost as possible.
For the securities analyst, a market bubble presented an even more serious problem: it is
simply dangerous to be sane in an insane world. The securities analyst who prudently predicted
reasonable growth and stock appreciation was quickly left in the dust by the investment guru
who prophecized a new investment paradigm in which revenues and costs were less important
than the number of Ahits@ on a website. Moreover, as the IPO market soared in the 1990's,
securities analysts became celebrities and valuable assets to their firms;40 indeed, they became
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Paper No. 4330-02 (available from Social Sciences Research Network at
www.ssrn.com at id= 296557). Firms purchasing more non-audit services were
found more likely to just meet or beat analysts= forecasts, which is the standard
profile of the firm playing Athe numbers game.@
For the view that investment banking firms changed their competitive strategies
on or around 1996 and thereafter sought the Apopular, high-profile analyst@ as a
means of acquiring IPO clients, see Morgenson, supra note 27 at Section 3-1
(quoting chief investment officer at Trust Company of the West).
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the principal means by which investment banks competed for IPO clients, as the underwriter
with the Astar@ analyst could produce the biggest first day stock price spike. But as their salaries
thus soared, analyst compensation came increasingly from the investment banking side of their
firms. Hence, just as in the case of the auditor, the analyst=s economic position became
increasingly dependent on favoring the interests of persons outside their profession (i.e.,
consultants in the case of the auditor and investment bankers in the case of the analyst) who had
little reason to respect or observe the standards or professional culture within the gatekeeper=s
profession.
The common denominator linking these examples is that, as auditors increasingly sought
consulting income and as analysts increasingly competed to maximize investment banking
revenues, the gatekeepers= need to preserve their reputational capital for the long run slackened.
Arguably, it could become more profitable for firms to realize the value of their reputational
capital by trading on it in the short-run than by preserving it forever. Indeed, if it were true that
auditing became a loss leader in the 1990's, one cannot expect firms to expend resources or
decline business opportunities in order to protect reputations that were only marginally
profitable.
c. Towards Synthesis
These explanations still do not fully explain why reputational capital built up over
decades might be sacrificed (or, more accurately, liquidated) once legal risks decline and/or a
bubble develops. Here, additional factors need to be considered.
a. The Increased Incentive for Short Term Stock Price Maximization
The pressure on gatekeepers to acquiesce in earnings management was not constant over
time, but rather grew during the 1990's. In particular, during the 1990's, executive compensation
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shifted from being primarily cash based to being primarily equity based. The clearest measure of
this change is the growth in stock options. Over the last decade, stock options rose from five
percent of shares outstanding at major U.S. companies to fifteen percent - - a three hundred
percent increase.41 The value of these options rose by an even greater percentage and over a
dramatically shorter period: from $50 billion in 1997 in the case of the 2,000 largest corporations
to $162 billion in 2000 - - an over three hundred percent rise in three years.42 Stock options
create an obvious and potentially perverse incentive to engage in short-run, rather than longterm, stock price maximization because executives can exercise their stock options and sell the
underlying shares on the same day.43 In truth, this ability was, itself, the product of deregulatory
reform in the early 1990's, which relaxed the rules under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to permit officers and directors to exercise stock options and sell the
underlying shares without holding the shares for the previously required six month period.44
41
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See Gretchen Morgenson, “Corporate Conduct: News Analysis; Bush Failed to
Stress Need to Rein in Stock Options,” New York Times, July 11, 2002 at C -1;
see also Gretchen Morgenson, “Market Watch: Time Fo r Accountability At the
Corporate Candy Store,” New York Times, March 3, 2002, Section 3, p.1.
See Morgenson, “Corporate Conduct,” supra note 41, at C-1 (citing study by
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.). Thus, if $162 billion is the value of all options in
these 2,000 companies, aggressive accounting policies that temporarily raise
stock prices by as little as ten percent create a potential gain for executives of
over $16 billion - - a substantial incentive.
This point has now been made by a variety of commentators who have called for
minimum holding periods or other curbs on stock options. These include Henry
M. Paulson, Jr., chief executive of Goldman, Sachs, and Senator John McCain of
Arizona. See David Leonhardt, “Corporate Conduct: Compensation: Anger At
Executives’ Profits Fuels Support for Stock Curb,” New York Times, July 9, 2002
at A-1.
Rule 16b-3(d) expressly permits an officer or director otherwise subject to the
“short-swing” profit provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to exercise a qualified stock option and sell the underlying shares
immediately “if at least six months elapse from the date of the acquisition of the
derivative security to the date of disposition of the ... underlying equity security.”
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Thus, if executives inflate the stock price of their company through premature revenue
recognition or other classic earnings management techniques, they could quickly bail out in the
short term by exercising their options and selling, leaving shareholders to bear the cost of the
stock decline when the inflated stock price could not be maintained over subsequent periods.
Given these incentives, it becomes rational for corporate executives to use lucrative consulting
contracts, or other positive and negative incentives, to induce gatekeepers to engage in conduct
that made the executives very rich. The bottom line is then that the growth of stock options
placed gatekeepers under greater pressure to acquiesce in short-term oriented financial and
accounting strategies.
b. The Absence of Competition. The Big Five obviously dominated a very concentrated
market. Smaller competitors could not expect to develop the international scale or brand names
that the Big Five possessed simply by quoting a cheaper price. More importantly, in a market
this concentrated, implicit collusion develops easily. Each firm could develop and follow a
common competitive strategy in parallel without fear of being undercut by a major competitor.
Thus, if each of the Big Five were to prefer a strategy under which it acquiesced to clients at cost
of an occasional litigation loss and some public humiliation, it could more easily observe this
policy if it knew that it would not be attacked by a holier-than-thou rival stressing its greater
See 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-3(d). The SEC comprehensively revised its rules under
Section 16(b) in 1991, in part to facilitate the use of stock options as executive
compensation and to “reduce the regulatory burden” under Section 16(b). See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869 1991 SEC LEXIS 171 (February
8, 1991). A premise of this reform was that “holding derivative securities is
functionally equivalent to holding the underlying equity security for purpose of
Section 16.” Id. at *35 to *36. Hence, the SEC permitted the tacking of the
option holding period with the stock’s holding period, thereby enabling officers
and directors to exercise options and sell on the same day (if the option had
already been held six months).
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reputation for integrity as a competitive strategy. This approach does not require formal
collusion but only the expectation that one=s competitors would also be willing to accept
litigation losses and occasional public humiliation as a cost of doing business.
Put differently, either in a less concentrated market where several dozen firms competed
or in a market with low barriers to entry, it would be predictable that some dissident firm would
seek to market itself as distinctive for its integrity. But in a market of five firms (and only four
for the future), this is less likely.
c. Observability. That a fraud occurs is not necessarily the fault of auditors. If they can
respond to any fraud by asserting that they were victimized by a dishonest management, auditors
may be able to avoid the permanent loss of reputational capital - - particularly so long as their
few competitors have no desire to exploit their failures because they are more or less equally
vulnerable. Put differently, a system of reputational intermediaries works only if fault can be
reliably assigned.
d. Principal/Agent Problems. Auditing firms have always known that an individual
partner could be dominated by a large client and might defer excessively to such a client in a
manner that could inflict liability on the firm. Thus, early on, they developed systems of internal
monitoring that were far more elaborate than anything that law firms have yet attempted. But
within the auditing firm, this internal monitoring function is not all powerful. After all, it is not
itself a profit center. With the addition of consulting services as a major profit center, a natural
coalition developed between the individual audit partner and the consulting divisions; each had a
common interest in checking and overruling the firm=s internal audit division when the latter=s
prudential decisions would prove costly to them. Cementing this marriage was the use of
incentive fees. If those providing software consulting services for an audit firm were willing to
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offer the principal audit partner for a client a fee of 1% (or so) of any contract sold to the
partner=s audit client, few others within the firm might see any reason to object. If software
consulting contracts (hypothetically, for $50 million) were then sold to the client, the audit
partner might now receive more compensation from incentive fees for cross-selling than from
auditing and thus had greater reason to value the client=s satisfaction above his interest in the
firm=s reputational capital. More importantly, the audit partner now also had an ally in the
consultants= who similarly would want to keep their mutual client satisfied, and together they
would form a coalition potentially able to override the protests of their firm=s internal audit unit
(if it felt that an overly aggressive policy was being followed). While case histories exactly
matching this pattern cannot yet be identified, abundant evidence does exist for the thesis that
incentive fees can bias audit decision-making.45 Interestingly, Enron itself presents a fact pattern
in which the audit firm=s on-the-scene quality control officer was overruled and replaced.46
III. Implications
A. Models for Reform
45
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One of the most famous recent accounting scandals involved the Phar-Mor chain
of retail stores. There, after the audit partner for Coopers & LyBrand was denied
participation in profit sharing because he had insufficiently cross-sold the firm=s
services, he sold $900,000 worth of business in the next year (most of it to PharMar and its affiliates), but then failed to detect $985 million in inflated earnings
by Phar-Mor over the following three years. See Prentice, supra note 10, at 184;
Max Bazerman et. al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, Sloan
Management Review (Summer 1997) at 89.
Carl E. Bass, an internal audit partner, warned other Andersen partners in 1999
that Enron=s accounting practices were dangerous. David Duncan and Enron
executives are alleged to have had Mr. Bass removed from the Enron account
within a few weeks after his protest. See Robert Manor and Jon Yates, AFaceless
Andersen partner in spotlight=s glare; David Duncan vital to federal probe after
plea,@ Chicago Tribune, April 14, 2002 at p. C-1. If nothing else, this evidence
suggests that the internal audit function within one Big Five firm could be
overcome when the prospective consulting fees were high enough.
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Does it matter much which of the foregoing two stories - - the deterrence story or
the bubble story B is deemed more persuasive? Although they are complementary rather than
contradictory, their relative plausibility matters greatly in terms of deciding what reform are
necessary or desirable. To the extent one accepts the deterrence story, we may need legal
changes. In principle, these changes could either raise the costs or lower the benefits of
acquiescence to auditors. To the extent one accepts the bubble story, the problem may be selfcorrecting. That is, once the bubble bursts, gatekeepers come back into fashion, as investors
become skeptics who once again demand assurances that only credible reputational
intermediaries can provide. To the extent, one takes the reverse position, regulatory action is
needed.
This comment is not intended to resolve this debate, except in one small respect. Alan
Greenspan has recently espoused the bubble story and expressed the view that the market will
largely self-correct on its own.47 His arguments have some merit. Although reasonable people
can certainly debate the degree to which markets can reform themselves and the reciprocal
degree to which legal interventions are necessary, one special area stands out where regulatory
47

See ARemarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, >Corporate Governance= at the Stern
School of Business, New York University, New York, New York, March 26,
2002" (available on the Federal Reserves website at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches). In his view, earnings management
came to dominate management=s agenda, and as a result: AIt is not surprising that
since 1998 earnings restatements have proliferated. This situation is a far cry
from earlier decades when, if my recollection serves me correctly, firms competed
on the basis of which one had the most conservative set of books. Short-term
stock price values then seemed less of a focus than maintaining unquestioned
credit worthiness.@ Id. at p. 4. He goes on to predict that: AA change in behavior,
however, may already be in train.@ Id. at p. 5. Specifically, he finds that
Aperceptions of the reliability of firms= financial statements are increasingly
reflected in yield spreads of corporate bonds@ and that other signs of selfcorrection are discernible. Id.
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interventions seem essential, because ultimately the market cannot easily self-correct within this
area without external interventions. Enron has shown that we have a Arule-based@ system of
accounting that arguably only asks the gatekeeper to certify the issuer=s compliance with an
inventory of highly technical rules - - without the auditor necessarily taking responsibility for the
overall accuracy of the issuer=s statement of its financial position. Understandably, the SEC has
called for a shift to a Aprinciples-based@ system of accounting,48 and this shift cannot come
simply through private action.
Even as a matter of theory, the gatekeeper=s services have value only if the gatekeeper is
certifying compliance with a meaningful substantive standard. Yet, it is seldom not within the
power of the individual gatekeeper to determine that standard of measurement. In the case of
auditors, organizational reform of the accounting firm thus will mean little without substantive
reform of substantive accounting principles.
Again, reasonable persons can disagree as to the best means of improving the quality of
the financial standards with which the auditor measures compliance. One means would be to
require the auditor to certify not simply compliance with GAAP, but to read the auditor=s
certification that the issuer=s financial statements Afairly present@ its financial position to mean
that these financial statements provide the necessary disclosures for understanding the issuer=s
overall financial position. This probably was the law (and may still be). Interestingly, the SEC=s
staff has recently sought to resurrect the classic decision of Henry Friendly in U.S. v. Simon49 by
arguing that compliance with GAAP was not itself the standard by which the auditor=s
48
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See Bloomberg News, February 19, 2002, Judy Mathenson and Neil Roland,
ASEC=s Pitt Calls for >Principles-Based= Accounting@ (available on
LEXIS/NEXIS; news; curnws file).
425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
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performance was to be measured.50 The alternative route, which does not involve greater
reliance on litigation, is to depend upon substantive regulation: here, this would require greater
activism by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), which in the past has been
constrained by industry and Congressional interference. Insulating the FASB and assuring its
financial independence would thus be appropriate initial steps toward reform.51
B. Lessons for Lawyers
What are the lessons for lawyers that emerge from this tour of the problems and failings
of our allied professions? Arguably, just as analysts and auditors do, securities lawyers serve
investors as the ultimate consumers of their services. Conceptually, however, differences exist
because lawyers specialize in designing transactions to avoid regulatory, legal, and other costly
hurdles, but seldom provide meaningful certifications to investors. Still, the same
Acommodification@ of professional services that reshaped the accounting profession has also
impacted the legal profession. Thus, there may be handwriting on the wall in fact that, as
auditing firms evolved from offering a single professional service into a shopping center of
50
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See Floyd Norris, “An Old Case Is Returning to Haunt Auditors,” New York
Times, March 1, 2002, at C-1 (noting that SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt has taken to
citing Simon).
In this author’s judgment, Congress has no more business legislating laws of
accounting than it does legislating a law of gravity. But it can create a neutral and
independent body to promulgate substantive accounting rules. At present, FASB
receives much of its revenues from charitable contributions from persons
interested in accounting. Unfortunately, those most interested in accounting (i.e.,
Enron) have the worst incentives. In addition, insulated bodies may need to be
subjected to greater sunlight and transparency. These issues were recently the
focus of hearings on June 26, 2002 before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade
and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives, at which this author testified. See Federal Document
Clearinghouse Congressional Testimony, June 26, 2002, House Energy and
Commerce Committee Hearings, “Strengthening Accounting Oversight”
(available on LEXIS/NEXIS news library; curnws file).
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professional services, they lost internal control. Bluntly, the same fate could face lawyers.
Indeed, the audit firm always knew that the individual audit partner serving the large client could
become conflicted (because the audit partner=s job depended on satisfying its single client), but
the audit firm also knew that it could monitor its individual audit partners to manage this
conflict. For a long time, monitoring seemingly worked - - at least passably well. More
recently, incentive-based compensation has exacerbated the monitoring problem, and similarly
the evolution of the auditing firm into a financial conglomerate has seriously compromised old
systems of internal control.52
Whatever the control problems within accounting firms, law firms have nothing even
remotely approaching the substantial system of internal controls employed by audit firms (which
still did not work for them). The contrast is striking. Both audit firms and broker-dealers have
far more advanced systems of internal quality control than do law firms. For example, audit
firms typically have an in-house Ainternal standards@ or Aquality assurance@ division, and they
rely on periodic Apeer review@ of their audits by similarly situated firms. Although peer review,
at least as a formal system, may not work for law firms (because law is an adversarial profession
and also one obsessed with protecting the attorney client privilege), this conclusion only raises
the larger question: what will work?53
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Enron itself shows this patter, as the Andersen audit quality partner who
challenged some of the aggressive accounting policies that Enron wanted to
pursue was outflanked and eventually transferred. See Manor & Yates, supra
note 46.
This short Comment is not the best vehicle in which to outline specific reforms.
Nonetheless, one could imagine law firms creating a “quality control” office and
staffing it with the sixty-year-old partners who today tend to be pushed into
retirement because they no longer can work the around-the-clock pace of young
partners. Precisely because such partners have experience, they would have
credibility with their peers in the firm in seeking to maintain firm quality.
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In overview, law firms are today positioned on a learning curve that seems at least a
decade behind auditing firms, as the law firms are moving, much later than auditing firms, from
Ama and pa@ single office firms to multi-branch organizations. Across the legal landscape, the
combination of lateral recruitment of partners, based on revenues generated, plus the movement
toward multi-branch law firms means that law firms as an organization are at least (and probably
more) vulnerable to quality control problems as auditing firms. Yet, they lack the minimal
institutional safeguards that the latter have long used (with only limited success) to protect
quality control. Logically, law firms should perceive the need to institutionalize a greater quality
control function. Realistically, however, law firms have not experienced the same pattern of
devastating financial losses that, during the 1980's, threatened the very viability of auditing
firms.54 Thus, as a practical matter, law firms will probably not respond before the first large
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Various reasons can be given for the expansion of auditors’ liability during the
1970's and 1980's. Some stress the revision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
whose Section 552, adopted in 1975, vastly expanded the auditor’s liability for
negligence by substituting a forseeability standard for the former privity test. See
Thomas L. Grossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants’ Liability, 1988
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 213, 221-225 (1998). Others emphasize the development of
the class action in the 1980's, and in particular the “fraud on the market” doctrine,
developed by the lower federal courts in the early 1980's and accepted by the
Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which dispensed
with the need to prove individual reliance and thereby increased the likelihood of
class certification. Whatever the cause of the litigation explosion, the impact of
litigation costs on accounting firms is clearer. By 1992, securities fraud litigation
costs for simply the six largest accounting firms accounted for $783 million or
more than 14% of their audit revenues. In addition, they faced billions of dollars
in potential exposure. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., lst Sess. No.103-431 (1993)
(statement of Jake L. Netterville), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1696,
(January 10, 1996). One major auditing firm, Laventhol & Horwath, did fail and
enter bankruptcy as a result of litigation and associated scandals growing out of
the savings and loan scandals of the 1980's. See “What Role Should CPA’s be
Playing in Audit Reform?,” Partner’s Report for CPA Firm Owners, April, 2002
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financial disaster befalls a major law firm and motivates greater attention to internal control.
Predictably but sadly, only then will Abottom line@-oriented law partners recognize that the
Abottom line@ includes liabilities as well as revenues.
CONCLUSION
This essay has sought to explain that Enron is more about gatekeeper failure than board
failure. It has also sought to explain when gatekeepers (or Areputational intermediaries@) are
likely to fail. Put simply, reputational capital is not an asset that professional services firms will
inevitably hoard and protect. Logically, as legal exposure to liability declines and as benefits of
acquiescence in the client=s demands increase, gatekeeper failure should correspondingly
increase - - as it did in the 1990's. Market bubbles can also explain gatekeeper failure (and this
perspective probably works better in the case of the securities analysts, who faced little liability
in the past), because in an environment of euphoria investors do not rely on gatekeepers (and
hence gatekeepers have less leverage with respect to their clients).
Popular commentary has instead used softer-edged concepts - - such as “infectious
greed”55 and a decline in morality - - to explain the same phenomena. Yet, there is little
evidence that “greed” has ever declined; nor is it clear that there are relevant policy options for
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(discussing experience of Laventhol & Horwath). The accounting profession’s
bitter experience with class litigation in the 1980's and 1990's probably explains
why it became the strongest and most organized champion of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has coined this rhetorical phrase,
saying that “An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business
community.” See Floyd Norris, “The Markets: Market Place; Yes, He Can Top
That,” New York Times, July 17, 2002 at A-1. This article’s more cold-blooded
approach would say that the rational incentives created by stock options and
equity compensation overcame the limited self-regulatory safeguards that the
accounting profession had internalized.
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addressing it. In contrast, focusing on gatekeepers tells us that there are special actors in a
system of private corporate governance whose incentives must be regulated.
Reasonable persons can always disagree what reforms are desirable. But the starting
point for an intelligent debate is the recognition that the two major, contemporary crises now
facing the securities markets - - i.e., the collapse of Enron and the growing controversy over
securities analysts, which began with the New York Attorney General=s investigation into
Merrill, Lynch - - involve at bottom the same problem: both are crises motivated by the
discovery by investors that reputational intermediaries upon whom they relied were conflicted
and seemingly sold their interests short. Neither the law nor the market has yet solved either of
these closely related problems.
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